An element of the possibly unbounded core of a cooperative game with precedence constraints belongs to its bounded core if any transfer to a player from any of her subordinates results in payoffs outside the core. The bounded core is the union of all bounded faces of the core, it is nonempty if the core is nonempty, and it is a continuous correspondence on games with coinciding precedence constraints. If the precedence constraints generate a connected hierarchy, then the core is always nonempty. It is shown that the bounded core is axiomatized similarly to the core for classical cooperative games, namely by boundedness (BOUND), nonemptiness for zero-inessential two-person games (ZIG), anonymity, covariance under strategic equivalence (COV), and certain variants of the reduced game property (RGP), the converse reduced game property (CRGP), and the reconfirmation property. The core is the maximum solution that satisfies a suitably weakened version of BOUND together with the remaining axioms. For games with connected hierarchies, the bounded core is axiomatized by BOUND, ZIG, COV, and some variants of RGP and CRGP, whereas the core is the maximum solution that satisfies the weakened version of BOUND, COV, and the variants of RGP and CRGP.
Introduction
In the classical theory of cooperative games one assumes that all players may cooperate, i.e., any coalition may form. However, a more general model for cooperative games with or without transferable utilities (TU or NTU) is necessary in order to describe situations in which cooperation is restricted. In this paper we adopt the model of Faigle and Kern (1992) who assume that the set of players has a hierarchical structure generated by some partial order relation. Only those coalitions may form (are feasible) that satisfy the following condition: With any player all of her subordinates (i.e., the players preceding her according to the partial order relation) must also be members of the coalition. If all players are incomparable, then any coalition is feasible so that classical cooperative games may be seen as special cooperative games with precedence constraints.
The well-known fact that the core of a TU game with precedence constraints may be unbounded seems counterintuitive and has created several attempts to define a meaningful subset of the core that is bounded (see, e.g., Grabisch (2011) ). The core of such a game is a convex polyhedral set that contains no lines, but, in contrast to the core of a classical TU game, it may have unbounded faces. Thus, attempts have been made to extract certain bounded faces of the core if the core itself is unbounded. In this paper, rather than trying to select one or some of the bounded faces, we consider the union of all bounded faces and call this union the "bounded core". An element x of the core belongs to the bounded core if, for any player, each of her subordinates is a member of some coalition effective for x that does not contain the player. Thus, in this sense each player takes the maximum of her subordinates.
The bounded core, though not convex, has many properties in common with the core of classical games. E.g., it is a connected, bounded, and closed set, and as a correspondence it is continuous. Faigle's (1989) generalization of the Bondareva-Shapley theorem may be used to show that the (bounded) core is nonempty whenever the underlying partial order generates a connected hierarchy. The bounded core may also be supported by its axiomatization by simple and intuitive axioms. Indeed, according to Hwang and Sudhölter (2001) the core is axiomatized by boundedness (BOUND), nonemptiness for zero-inessential two-person games (ZIG), anonymity, covariance under strategic equivalence (COV), the reduced game property (RGP), the converse reduced game property (CRGP), and the reconfirmation property. Suitable extensions and versions of the foregoing axioms characterize the bounded core if precedence constraints are possible. Moreover, the existing robustness results may be extended and even the bounded core of NTU games with precedence constraints may be characterized. If one restricts the attention to cooperative TU games on connected hierarchies then the core is axiomatized by BOUND, ZIG, COV, and some variants of RGP and CRGP. The unbounded core, though certainly less interesting, may be supported as the maximum solution that satisfies a suitably weakened version of BOUND (requiring that the payoffs to any feasible singleton are bounded from below) and (a subset of the) remaining axioms.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall basic definitions of a partially ordered set, of TU games with precedence constraints, and of the core. Moreover, the bounded core is formally introduced and an example is given that shows that the bounded core may be non-convex. In Section 3 we show that the bounded core of a game with a connected hierarchy is nonempty and that the bounded core on the set of balanced games with coinciding precedence constraints is upper and lower hemicontinuous, whereas the core correspondence is lower hemicontinuous, but may fail to be upper hemicontinuous. In Section 4 we present the aforementioned generalizations of the robust axiomatizations of the core for classical TU and NTU games. Finally, in Section 5 we explicitly present the axiomatization of the bounded core when hierarchies are supposed to be connected. This axiomatization is much simpler and, hence, more appealing than in the general case. Also, we present examples that show that each of the employed axioms is logically independent of the remaining axioms.
A partially ordered set (poset) is a pair (P, ) such that P is a nonempty finite set and is a partial order on P , i.e., a reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation on P . As usual, we write x y for (x, y) ∈ and use x ≺ y if x y and x = y. If x ≺ y and there is no z ∈ N such that x ≺ z ≺ y then y covers x, denoted by x ≺· y. A chain in (P, ) is a sequence (x 0 , . . . , x q ) such that x 0 ≺ · · · ≺ x q where q is called the length of the chain. The height of a poset is the length of its longest chain.
Let U be a set, the universe of players, containing, without loss of generality, 1, . . . , k whenever |U | k.
A coalition is a finite nonempty subset of U . Let N be a coalition and (N, ) be a poset. Then S ⊆ N is a downset of (N, ) if i ∈ S and j i implies j ∈ S. Denote by F the set of downsets of (N, ). Note that (F , ⊆) is a distributive lattice of height 1 |N |. By Birkhoff's representation theorem the opposite statement is also true: If F ⊆ 2 N and (F, ⊆) is a distributive lattice of height |N |, then there exists a poset (N, ) such that F = F .
A (cooperative TU) game with precedence constraints (see Faigle and Kern (1992) ) is a triple (N, , v) such that N is a coalition, (N, ) is a poset, and v :
Hence, we may identify a game (N, v) with (N, , v) where (N, ) is the poset of height 0.
Let Γ denote the set of games with precedence constraints and (N, , v) ∈ Γ. Let
denote the set of feasible and Pareto efficient feasible payoffs (preimputations), respectively. We use x(S) = i∈S x i (x(∅) = 0) for every S ∈ 2 N and every x ∈ R N as a convention. Additionally, x S denotes the restriction of x to S, i.e. x S = (x i ) i∈S , and we write x = (x S , x N \S ).
The core of (N, , v), denoted by C(N, , v), is defined by
By its definition, the core of (N, , v) is a convex polyhedral set. It is well known (see Derks and Gilles (1995) ) that it does not contain lines. More precisely,
where "conv" means "convex hull", "ext" means "set of extreme points", and "+" denotes "Minkowski sum". For any S ⊆ N, let N χ S = χ S ∈ R N be the indicator function of S, i,e. χ S i = 1 for i ∈ S and χ S j = 0 for j ∈ N \ S. If (N, , v) is a classical game, i.e., if the height of (N, ) is 0, then C(N, , 0) = {0}.
Otherwise, i.e., if there exists a pair (i, j) ∈ N such that i ≺ j, then (see Derks and Gilles (1995) )
where "cone" denotes "convex cone generated by".
(also shown by Tomizawa (1983) , see also Fujishige (2005, Th. 3.26) ). We are now ready to define the bounded core. , v) , is the set of all elements x ∈ C(N, , v) that satisfy the following condition for any i, j ∈ N with i ≺· j: There is no
Thus, an element x of the core is in the bounded core, if no player j has an objection against any of the players i she covers in the sense that as soon as some "money" is transferred from i to j, i.e., x i is replaced by x i − ε and x j is replaced by x j + ε for some ε > 0, this would result in a preimputation that does not belong to the core. Interpreting the partial order as a hierarchy, we may say that i is an immediate (or direct) subordinate of j if i ≺· j. Then, the bounded core is the set of core elements such that every player takes the maximum of her direct subordinates, in the sense that any money transfer from a subordinate to her boss would result in a payoff vector outside the core.
The following result is an immediate consequence of (2.2) and (2.4).
Therefore, if (N, , v) is a classical game, the bounded core coincides with the classical core. The following example shows that the bounded core may be non-convex and, hence, a proper subset of the convex hull of the extreme points of the core (called "convex part of the core").
Example 2.4 Let N = {1, . . . , 4} and be defined by i ≺· j iff i = 1 and j ∈ {2, 3}. Hence,
, and v(S) = 0 for all other S ∈ F. With x = (0, 4, 4, 0) and y = (2, 0, 0, 6), both x and y are elements of
Properties of the core
Let N ⊆ U be a finite nonempty set. We recall Lemma 6.7 of Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley (1972) saying that a balanced collection of subsets is separating.
of balancing weights. Note that for any balanced collection B with system (δ S ) S∈B of balancing weights,
Thus, any balanced collection B is separating in the sense that the following condition is satisfied for all k, ∈ N : If there exists S ∈ B with / ∈ S k, then there exists T ∈ B with k / ∈ T .
A balanced collection B is minimal balanced if it does not contain a proper balanced subcollection. Note that a balanced collection is minimal balanced if and only if it has a unique system of balancing weights. Now, we are ready to formulate the well-known generalization of the sharp form of the Bondareva-Shapley theorem .
Theorem 3.1 (Faigle (1989) ) Let (N, , v) ∈ Γ. A necessary and sufficient condition that the core of (N, , v) is not empty is that for each minimal balanced collection B ∈ F with B = {N },
where (δ S ) S∈B is the system of balancing weights for B.
Let (N, ) be a poset and i, j ∈ S ⊆ N . We say that i and j are connected in (S, ) if there is a path in S that connects i and j, that is, if there exist k ∈ N and i 1 , . . . , i k ∈ N such that i = i 1 , j = i k , and, for each = 1, . . . , k − 1, either i ≺ i +1 or i +1 ≺ i . Any ∅ = S ⊆ N may be partitioned into its connected components, and S ⊆ N is connected if S = ∅ or S consists of a single component.
Lemma 3.2 Let (N, ) be a poset and N ⊆ U .
(1) If (N, ) is connected (i.e., N consists of a unique connected component), then C(N, , v) = ∅ for
Proof:
(1) Let B ⊆ F be a balanced collection and (δ S ) S∈B be a system of balancing weights. In view of Theorem 3.1 it suffices to show that N is the unique nonempty element of B. Let R ∈ B, R = ∅.
Then there exists i ∈ R. In order to show that R = N , let j = i. As (N, ) is connected, there exist
We show that i ∈ R by induction on . For = 0 nothing has to be proved. Assume that i ∈ R
As F is the set of downsets, any S ∈ B with i +1 ∈ S also contains i . As B is separating, i +1 ∈ R.
(2) Let (N, ) be non connected and v be a mapping on F with v(∅) = 0 that satisfies 
Remark 3.5 According 2 to Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink (1992) a permission structure of N is a directed graph on N . A subset of N is autonomous if it contains with any player i each tail of an arc with head i. Hence, the set of autonomous coalitions remains unchanged if the directed graph is replaced by its transitive closure. In particular, the authors consider the transitive closure of an acyclic directed graph so that the set of autonomous subsets coincides with F = F, the set of downsets of the partial order determined by the requirement that i ≺ j if there is an arc from i to j. For any TU game u ∈ Γ N they define its conjunctive restriction w ∈ Γ N by the requirement that, for any S ⊆ N , w(S) = u(σ(S)) where σ(S) denotes the unique maximal downset contained in S. Now, let v ∈ Γ be defined by v(S) = w(S)
for all S ∈ F. Then, by (i) of Corollary 3.4, C(u), C(w) ⊆ C(v). More precisely,
Indeed, if x ∈ C(w) and i ∈ N satisfies {i} / ∈ F, i.e., i is not a minimal element of (N, ), then σ({i}) = ∅ so that w({i}) = 0 and x i 0. In order to show the opposite inclusion, let x ∈ C(v) such that x i 0 for all non-minimal elements of N . If S ⊆ N , then all members of S \ σ(S) are non-minimal. Hence,
For an arbitrary v ∈ Γ we call w ∈ Γ N defined by w(S) = v(σ(S)) for all S ⊆ N the conjunctive restriction associated with v. Then it should be noted that (3.6) is valid and that, if v is monotonic, i.e.,
We recall that a collection N ⊆ F is normal (with respect to (w.r.t.) (N, )) if
is bounded (see Grabisch (2011) ).
Proposition 3.6 Let F = F for some fixed (N, ). Then for any game v ∈ Γ b
Proof: Take x ∈ C b (v). As in the proof of Lemma 3.3, for any pair (i, j) with j ≺· i, there exists S ∈ F, i ∈ S j, such that x(S) = v(S). By Lemma 2 of Grabisch (2011) , the collection of these S form a normal collection N . Hence x ∈ C N (v).
Conversely, take a normal collection N and x ∈ C N (v). Then by Lemma 2 again, for any pair (i, j)
with j ≺· i, there exists S ∈ N , such that i ∈ S j, and x(S) = v(S). Hence for any > 0, taking 
Proof: Choose any (i, j) ∈ S such that ε := min{x(S) − v(S) | S ∈ F, j / ∈ S i} > 0. Define
Theorem 3.8 The set-valued function C b : Γ b ⇒ R N is continuous.
Proof: uhc:
We first show that the graph of
this purpose, let v t ∈ Γ b and x t ∈ C b (v t ) for t ∈ N so that lim t→∞ v t = v and lim t→∞ x t = x. Clearly, x ∈ C(v). For any (i, j) ∈ S let S t (i,j) ∈ F such that j / ∈ S i and x t (S) = v t (S). As |F| is finite, for any (i, j) ∈ S there exists a collection S (i,j) ∈ F such that S t (i,j) = S (i,j) for infinitely many t ∈ N. Hence, x(S (i,j) ) = v(S (i,j) ) for all (i, j) ∈ S and x ∈ C b (v).
It suffices to show that C b is a bounded set valued function, i.e., the image of a compact subset Γ of Γ b is bounded. Now, as Γ is compact, there exists t 0 such that t b i (v) for all i ∈ N and v ∈ Γ . Let Γ be the set of all classical games w such that the restriction of w to F belongs to Γ and w(S) = |N |t for all S ∈ 2 N \ F. Then Γ inherits compactness from Γ . It is well-known (see Peleg and Sudhölter (2007, Chapter 9) ) that the core correspondence on classical balanced games is bounded. By Lemma 3.3, C b is bounded.
Moreover, a closed and bounded set-valued function is uhc.
lhc: Let v, v t ∈ Γ b for t ∈ N such that lim t→∞ v t = v, and let x ∈ C b (v). It suffices to construct a sequence x t ∈ C b (v t ) such that lim t→∞ x t = x. Define classical games w t such that w t (S) = v t (S) for all S ∈ F and w t (T ) = i∈T b i (v t ) for all T ∈ 2 N \ T . Moreover, let w ∈ Γ N be defined by w(S) = v(S) for all S ∈ F and w(T ) = i∈T b i (v) for all T ∈ 2 N \ T . Then lim t→∞ w t = w and, by Corollary 3.4, x ∈ C(w). As C is lhc on classical games, there exist y t ∈ C(w t ) such that lim t→∞ y t = x. By Corollary 3.4, y t ∈ C(v t ). By Lemma 3.7 and the triangle inequality there exist
The set-valued function C : Γ b ⇒ R N inherits lhc from C b . Indeed, if x ∈ C(v), then there exist y ∈ C b (v) and z ∈ C(0) such that x = y + z. Now, if lim t→∞ v t = v, then by lhc of C b there exist
However, C is not bounded unless the height of (N, ) is 0. We now present an example that shows that C may not be continuous (uhc) even in the case |N | = 2.
Example 3.9 Let N = {1, 2} and 1 ≺ 2. Let v and v t be defined by
open set that contains C(v). However, for any t ∈ N there exist x 1 > 0 such that
Axiomatization of the bounded core
A solution on Γ ⊆ Γ is a mapping σ that associates with each (N, , v) ∈ Γ a set σ(N, , v) ⊆ X * (N, , v). Let σ be a solution on some Γ ⊆ Γ. Then the restriction of σ to any Γ is a solution on Γ so that we say that σ is a solution on Γ , too. If Γ is not specified, then we mean that σ is a solution on Γ (and any of its subsets).
We now generalize some well-known properties of a solution on a set of classical games.
A solution σ on Γ ⊆ Γ satisfies:
(2) Covariance under strategic equivalence (COV) if, for all (N, , v) , (N, , w) ∈ Γ , α > 0, and β ∈ R N , the following condition is valid: If w(S) = αv(S) + β(S) for all S ∈ F , then σ(N, , w) = ασ(N, , v) + β. Let x ∈ R N . The reduced game of (N, , v) w.r.t. S and x is the game (S, S , v S,x ) defined by
The solution σ satisfies the Similar proofs show the same results for the core on a set of games with precedence constraints, with one exception, namely BOUND. However, BOUND is a crucial assumption in the axiomatization of the core by Hwang and Sudhölter (2001) .
Lemma 4.3 The bounded core satisfies AN, COV, BOUND and CRGP on any Γ ⊆ Γ, and it satisfies RGP on any set Γ ⊆ Γ that is closed under reduction w.r.t. elements of the bounded core.
Proof: Clearly, C b inherits AN and COV from C. Let (N, , v) ∈ Γ. By Proposition 3.6, BOUND is proved. Let x ∈ C(N, , v) and ∅ = S ⊆ N . Define u = v S,x . By Remark 4.2, x S ∈ C(S, S , u). If
, then there exist i, j ∈ S and ε > 0 such that i ≺ S ·j and y S := x S + ε( (N, , v) . Hence, the bounded core satisfies RGP provided that the reduced games w.r.t. bounded core elements belong to the set of games under consideration. In order to show CRGP, assume that |N | 2 and that x ∈ X(N, , v) and x S ∈ C(S, S , v S,x ) for all S ⊆ N with |S| = 2.
By Remark 4.2, x ∈ C (N, , v) . If x / ∈ C b (N, , v), then there exist i, j ∈ N and ε > 0 such that i ≺· j
The following example shows that the bounded core may not satisfy RCP.
Example 2.4 cont. Let S = {1, 4}, = S , and u = v S,y . Then u({1}) = 2, u({4}) = 0, and u(S) = 8 so that with z 1 = 8 and
Hence, we use a weaker property than RCP. Let (N, ) be a poset and i, j ∈ N . We say that a solution σ on Γ ⊆ Γ satisfies the reconfirmation property w.r.t. classical games RCP cg if it satisfies (8) for all classical games (N, , v) ∈ Γ (i.e., the height of (N, ) is 0). Hence, on sets of classical TU games, RCP and RCP cg cannot be distinguished.
Note that the bounded core coincides with the core on any set of classical games so that it satisfies RCP cg on any set of games with precedence constraints.
Till the end of this section we have to assume that |U | 5 because this assumption is already crucial for the results on classical games. Hence, by CRGP and RGP, it suffices to show that σ coincides with the bounded core for any two-person game that is not a classical game. Indeed, assume that this property holds. Take x ∈ σ(N, , v). By RGP of σ, for any S ⊆ N , |S| = 2, x S ∈ σ(S, S , u) = C b (S, S , u), where u is the reduced game. Then ∈ σ(N, , v) . By COV, αx ∈ σ(N, , αv) for any α > 0. As αv = v = 0, x = 0 by BOUND. Hence,
In order to characterize the core, we basically replace BOUND by individual rationality: A solution σ in a set Γ ⊆ Γ is (9) individually rational (IR) if, for any (N, , v) ∈ Γ , x ∈ σ(N, , v), and i ∈ N , the following property holds: If {i} ∈ F , then x i v({i});
(4') bounded w.r.t. singletons (BOUND s ) if for any (N, , v) ∈ Γ , the restriction of σ(N, , v) to the set {i ∈ N | {i} ∈ F } is bounded from below 3 .
Clearly IR implies BOUND s .
Moreover, for classical TU games, BOUND and BOUND s are equivalent. Let σ and σ be solutions on hence αv = v for any α > 0. We conclude αx ∈ σ(N, , v) so that x i 0 by BOUND s . Now, consider S = {i}, denoting the reduced game by u. By RGP, x i ∈ σ({i}, {i} , u). Since the reduced game is a classical game, 5 The bounded core for games with connected hierarchies
Note that the results of the present section are valid for any universe U of players. However, some axiom in one of the characterizations may only be logically independent of the remaining axioms if |U | ≥ 3.
We say that (N, , v) ∈ Γ has a connected hierarchy if (N, ) is connected. Let Γ ch denote the set of all TU games (N, , v) that have connected hierarchies. This section is devoted to an axiomatization of the bounded core for games with connected hierarchies.
In order to characterize the core on Γ ch , the following variant of the reduced game property is useful. A solution σ on Γ ⊆ Γ satisfies Lemma 5.1 On Γ ch the bounded core satisfies RGP cc , CRGP cc , and NEM.
Proof: Let (N, , v) ∈ Γ ch . In order to show RGP cc , let ∅ = S be a connected coalition, and x ∈ C b (N, , v). Then S remains connected w.r.t. (S, S ) so that, as C b satisfies RGP, x S ∈ C b (S, S , v S,x ).
In order to show CRGP cc , assume that |N | 2 and x ∈ X(N, , v) \ C b (N, , v) . If x / ∈ C(N, , v), there exists T ∈ F such that v(T ) > x(T ). As ∅ = T = N and N are connected, there exist i ∈ T and j ∈ N \ T such that i ≺· j so that S = {i, j} is connected. Let u = v S,x . We have (S, S , u) ∈ Γ ch .
Moreover, x S / ∈ C(S, S , u), therefore x S ∈ C b (S, S , u). Indeed, u({i}) v(T ) − x(T \ i). Since v(T ) > x(T ), this entails u({i}) > x i . If x ∈ C(N, , v) \ C b (N, , v) , then, proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 4.3, there exist k, ∈ N such that k ≺· and ε > 0 such that y := x + ε(χ − χ k ) ∈ C(N, , v). As S = {k, } is connected, (S, S , v S,x ) ∈ Γ ch . As y S ∈ C(S, S , v S,x ), x S / ∈ C b (S, S , v S,x ). We conclude Note that the foregoing proof is similar to the proof of Peleg's (1986) axiomatization of the prekernel.
Lemma 5.4 If σ is a solution on Γ ch that satisfies COV, WRGP cc , and BOUND s , then σ is a subsolution of the core.
Proof: Let (N, , v) ∈ Γ ch . If |N | 2, the proof is finished by COV and BOUND s . If |N | 3, then
by WRGP cc applied to one-person reduced games (note that any singleton coalition is connected), any element of σ(N, , v) is Pareto optimal. Thus, σ satisfies PO. Let x ∈ σ(N, , v). As the core satisfies CRGP cc by Remark 5.2, x ∈ C(N, , v). q.e.d.
